Abstract
Global competition highlights asymmetries in the skill endowments of fi rms. Collaboration may provide an opportunity for one partner to share the skills of the other, and thus improve its position both within and without the alliance. One of the main reasons that fi rms participate in alliances is to learn know-how and capabilities from their allian ce partners. At the same time fi rms want to protect themselves from the opportunistic behaviour of their partners to retain their own core proprietary assets.
Firms use alliances for a variety of reasons: to gain competitive advantage in the marketplace, to access or internalize new technologies and know-how beyond fi rm boundaries, to exploit economies of scale and scope, or to share risk or uncertainty with their partners. On the one hand, alliances may help a fi rm absorb or learn some critical information or capability from its partner. On the other, they also increase the likelihood of unilaterally or disproportionately losing one's own core capability or skill to the partner.
Confl ict is inherent in alliances because of partner opportunism, goal divergence (Doz, 1996) and cross-cultural diff erences, and using explicit mechanism to manage confl ict will help fi rms to deal with these diffi culties. There has been a general tendency in the alliance literature to link formal governance mechanisms with the management of confl icts (Williamson, 1985) . But more recently, there is recogni-tion that a combination of contractual and organizational mechanisms (formal and informal) is more eff ective in managing confl ict (Doz, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998) .
It is possible to conceive of a fi rm as a portfolio of core competencies on one hand, and encompassing disciplines on the other, rather than as a portfolio of product-market entities (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) . The traditional competitive strategy paradigm (Porter, 1998) , with its focus on product-market positioning, focuses on only the last few hundred years of what may be a skill-building marathon. The notion of competitive advantage which provides the means for computing product based advantages at a given point in time (in terms of cost and diff erentiation), provides little insight into the process of knowledge acquisition and skill-building.
Cliquet sees the network as a hybrid organizational form consistent with specifi c assets. It is an effi cient governance structure because it maintains market incentives while bureaucratic distortions are avoided (cost minimization). The inter-fi rm network is considered as a trade system able to plan or react like an integrated fi rm whose internal effi cacy could be compared to market mechanism. The market and the hybrid form are two alternative modes of governance. The choice does not depend on the nature of attributes but on their degree. As a matter of fact, the network is not a proper object. From the introduction of the hybrid fi rm, it follows that the initial dichotomy between fi rm (labour relation) and market (trade relation) becomes fuzzy. There would be only contractual arrangements (fi rm, market and network) in competition. In this continuum thesis, the concept of network is defi ned by default: no market, nor hierarchy (Cliquet, 2007) .
There is another term for cooperation between distribution members in retail literature -vertical marketing system. it consists of all the levels of independently owned businesses along a channel of distribution. Goods and services are normally distributed through one of these systems: independent, partially integrated, and fully integrated. In an independent vertical marketing system, there are three levels of independently owned fi rms: manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. Such a system is most o en used in manufacturers or retailers are small, intensive distribution is sought, customers are widely dispersed, unit sales are high, company resources are low, channel members seek to share costs and risks, and task specialization is desirable. With a partially integrated system, two independently owned businesses along a channel perform all production and distribution functions. It is most common when a manufacturer and a retailer complete transactions and shipping, storing, and other distribution functions in the absence of a wholesaler. Through a fully integrated system, one fi rm performs all production and distribution functions. The fi rm has total control over its strategy, direct customer contact, and exclusivity over its off ering; it also keeps all profi ts. This system can be costly and requires a lot of expertise (Berman, Evans, 2010) .
METHODS AND RESOURCES
The paper focuses on a general theory of strategic alliances, synthesizing the various fi ndings in the literature on alliances from a resource-based view by examining the role of fi rm resources in strategic alliances. This theory covers four major aspects of strategic alliances: rationale, formation, structural preferences, and performance. The certain resource characteristics, such as imperfect mobility, imitability, and substitutability, promise accentuated valuecreation, and thus facilitate alliance formation. As part of the paper, author proposes a typology of inter-partner resource alignment based on the two dimensions of resource similarity and resource utilization, yielding four types of alignment: supplementary, surplus, complementary, and wasteful. There is also discussion how partner resource alignment directly aff ects collective strengths and interfi rm confl icts in alliances, which in turn contribute to alliance performance. Finally, suggested theoretical conclusions are implemented on proposal of model of strategic trade alliance for independent food retail networks in Czech Republic.
It is possible to divide the article into four parts. First, identifi cation of the resource characteristics of individual fi rms that are the antecedents of alliance formation is elaborated. Second, structural preferences for alliances, as determined by the resource types of partner fi rms are discussed. Third, there is a typology of inter-partner resource alignments and explore the eff ects of these resource alignments on alliance performance. Fourth, model of alliance in food independent trade is proposed.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Strategic alliances are voluntary cooperative interfi rm agreements aimed at achieving competitive advantage for the partners. A strategic alliance is also when two or more businesses join together for a set period of time. The businesses, usually, are not in direct competition, but have similar products or services that are directed toward the same target audience. Alliance means cooperation between groups that produces better results that can be gained from a transaction. A strategic is a partnership between fi rms whereby resources, capabilities and core competences are combined to pursue mutual interests. The specifi c resource profi les of individual fi rms that tend to encourage the formation of strategic alliances are examined in Fig. 1 for the proposed analytical framework.
Firm resources are important indicators of the likelihood of fi rms entering into strategic alliances. For instance, the possession of critical resources is a prerequisite for alliance formation. Some resource characteristics that prevent fi rms from moving toward resource homogeneity have been identifi ed as: imperfect mobility, imperfect imitability, and imperfect substitutability. Whereas imperfect mobility is concerned with barriers to getting the resources from the owners, imperfect imitability and imperfect substitutability refer to barriers to obtaining similar resources from elsewhere. Imagine a fi rm whose resources are perfectly or easily mobile, imitable, and substitutable. Clearly, other fi rms would be in a position to bid desirable resources away from such a fi rm in factor markets. Only if a fi rm cannot effi ciently get needed resources from elsewhereexcept by a sharing arrangement with its owners -will it be willing to form a strategic alliance. The point is that the more imperfect the mobility, imitability, and substitutability of a fi rm's resources are, the more likely that others will be interested in forming alliances with it.
P1: The more a fi rm's resources are characterized by imperfect mobility, imperfect imitability, and imperfect substitutability, the more likely the fi rm will get involved in strategic alliances.
Resource types and structural preferences
The simplest approach diff erentiates between tangible and intangible resources (Grant 1991) . Barney (1991) classifi es fi rm resources into physical capital resources, human capital resources, and organizational capital resources. Author suggests that a fi rm's resource profi le includes the following: fi nancial, physical, managerial, human, organizational, and technological resources. Property-based resources are legal properties owned by fi rms, including financial capital, physical resources and human resources. Owners enjoy clear property rights to these resources, or rights to use the resources, so that others cannot take them away without the owners' consent. Because others cannot take property-based resources away, alliance partners will not be overly concerned about unintended transfers of these resources (see Tab. I).
Strategic alliances can take a variety of forms, including, but not limited to, joint ventures, minority equity alliances, R&D contracts, joint production, joint marketing and promotion, enhanced supplier partnership, distribution agreements, and licensing agreements. Equity alliances include equity joint
Resource characteristics of firms

Mobility Imitability Substitutability
Alliance formation
Resource types of partner firms
Property-based resources Knowledge-based resources
Alliance structural preferences
Inter-partner resource alignments
Supplementary Surplus Complementary Wasteful
Alliance performance 1: Analytical framework and proposed relationship Source: Elaborated by author ventures and minority equity alliances, non-equity alliances refer to all other cooperative arrangements that do not involve equity exchange. Alliances are unilateral contract-based when they embody a welldefi ned transfer of property rights, such as the "technology for cash" exchange in licensing agreements. Licensing, distribution agreements, and R&D contracts are the main forms of unilateral contract-based alliances. The key feature here is that individual fi rms carry out their obligations independently of others. Such contracts tend to be complete and specifi c, and partners are expected to perform on their own accordingly, without much coordination or collaboration. Thus, the level of integration is relatively low in unilateral contract-based alliances. On the other hand, alliances are called bilateral contract-based when the partners have sustained production of property rights. As compared to unilateral contracts, bilateral contracts are usually incomplete and more open-ended. To some extent, partners of unilateral contract-based alliances have to let the cooperative relationship unfold itself. Now it is possible to discuss partners' structural preferences in terms of the four major categories of alliances: equity joint ventures, minority equity alliances, bilateral contract-based alliances, and unilateral contract-based alliances (see Tab. II).
Equity joint ventures are created to substantially integrate the joint eff orts of partners -separate entities in which the partners literally work together. Consequently, equity joint ventures provide the best opportunities to acquire partners' tacit knowledge and other knowledge-based resources. Because equity joint ventures enable a fi rm to better appropriate its partners' knowledge-based resources, they are preferable to the fi rm if knowledge-based resources are its partners' primary resource in the alliance. On the other hand, the advantage of a joint venture for a particular fi rm will be limited if its partner contributes mainly property-based resources. Furthermore, although fi rms will ordinarily want to acquire their partners' know-how, they are also wary about losing their own knowledge-based resources in a highly integrated operation characteristic of a joint venture. Thus, they will prefer this type only if knowledgebased resources are not their primary resource type in the alliance.
P2a: A partner fi rm will prefer an equity joint venture if, in the prospective alliance, its primary resources are propertybased and its partner's primary resources are knowledgebased.
In minority equity alliances, one or more partners take an equity position in others. Since equity arrangements are rather complicated to implement as well as to get out of, they are usually entered into for longer time horizons, compared to alliances without equity investments. A long duration for an alliance provides an incentive to partners to behave honestly and curb opportunistic behaviour. Firms will prefer this type when they have primarily knowledge-based resources to contribute to the alliance and their partners have primarily property-based resources. Contract-based alliances will be less attractive in such cases, because they do not off er suffi cient safeguards against opportunistic behaviour regarding knowledge-based resources. In this situation, equity joint ventures will also not be preferred, for two reasons. First, there are no substantial knowledge-based resources contributed by the partners available for exploitation. Second, there are altogether too much of one's own knowledge-based resources that the partner could potentially appropriate, making it too risky to form a joint venture.
P2b: A partner fi rm will prefer a minority equity alliance if, in the prospective alliance, its primary resources are knowledge-based and its partner's primary resources are propertybased.
Because equity joint ventures facilitate the process of transferring knowledge-based resources, they can be a disadvantage if both partners have substantial knowledge-based resources in an alliance. Thus, equity joint ventures may be too risky a choice in such situations. First, a fi rm would be concerned that its own tacit knowledge could be signifi cantly appro- priated by its partner fi rm. Second, when both partners have primarily knowledge-based resources for an alliance, they will be prepared to see the alliance, whether or not it is a joint venture, becoming a learning race (Hamel, 1991) . Also, the partners will be likely to believe in their ability to be the leader in such a learning race. Between the two types of contract-based alliances, the better choice is bilateral contract-based alliances if the mission is one of learning. In alliances such as joint production, joint R&D, and joint marketing and promotion, there are many more opportunities for learning than in unilateral contract-based alliances such as licensing and subcontracting.
P2c: A partner fi rm will prefer a bilateral contract-based alliance, if both partner fi rms' primary resources, in the prospective alliance, are knowledge-based.
Unilateral contract-based alliances include licensing, subcontracting, and distribution agreements. Their distinct characteristic is a comparatively light engagement of the partners. More "engaged" alliance forms are needed if the purpose of entering into an alliance is to secretly acquire knowledgebased resources. Following this logic, unilateral contract-based alliances will be preferable when both partners intend to contribute primarily propertybased resources to a prospective alliance. Since neither fi rm will be interested in secretly acquiring the other's tacit knowledge, there will be little need for a bilateral contract-based alliance. Unilateral contract-based alliances will provide the requisite clarity for exchange of property rights.
P2d: A partner fi rm will prefer a unilateral contract-based alliance, if both partner fi rms' primary resources, regarding the prospective alliance, are property-based.
Inter-partner resource alignment and alliance performance Performance of strategic alliances can be measured in several diff erent ways, such as alliance longevity and profi tability or in terms of meeting the objectives of individual partner fi rms. Clearly, then the performance of an alliance can be evaluated diff erently by each partner fi rm. Partner resource alignment refers broadly to the pattern, whereby the resources of partner fi rms are matched and integrated in an alliance. This pattern defi nes the resource-based relationship between the partners. This approach makes the clear assumption, largely unstated, that only resources related and useful to an alliance should be considered. Similar is not the same as supplementary, and dissimilar is not the same as complementary. Resource similarity in alliances is defi ned as the degree to which two partner fi rms contribute resources comparable, in terms of both type and amount, to an alliance. Resource similarity will be high if two partners contribute comparable amounts of similar types of resources to an alliance. Resource utilization, on the other hand, is the degree to which the resources contributed by the partners are utilized for achieving the goals of the alliance. The resource utilization dimension distinguishes performing resources from nonperforming resources. Performing resources are essential for alliance operation. By comparison, non-performing resources remain idle in the alliance; they are brought into the alliance mainly because they are not separable from certain other needed resources. In contrast to the two types of alignment (complementary and supplementary), the two dimensions in Tab. III suggest four types of partner resource alignment: supplementary, surplus, complementary, and wasteful.
Both supplementary alignment and complementary alignment have a positive eff ect on the collective strengths of the alliance. The more individual fi rms contribute supplementary resources to an alliance, the more they accumulate critical resources that would not, as a result, be easily available for deployment elsewhere. Since all such resources are of the performing kind (see Tab. III), the employment of these supplementary resources in the alliance suggests the pursuit of a value-creating strategy. Supplementarity of resources, in this sense, is always benefi cial to eff ective alliance performance.
P3a: Alliance performance is positively related to supplementary alignment.
P3b: Alliance performance is positively related to complementary alignment.
Furthermore, additional surplus and wasteful resources will not contribute to the collective strengths of an alliance, mainly because these resour ces by defi nition are not performing. These resources are essentially wasted and do not make the alliance more competitive. Surplus and wasteful resources may be diffi cult to avoid in alliances, since certain physical and technological resources cannot be easily separated. In any case, the surplus resources do not add to the alliances' collective strengths.
P3c: Alliance performance is positively related to surplus alignment.
Confl icts between partner fi rms tend to increase with a wasteful alignment, because wasteful resources o en suggest a lack of compatibility in the diff erent resources contributed by the partners. Formation of strategic alliance in the independent trade with FMCG in Czech Republic
The overall structure of the framework is illustrated in Fig. 2 . There is a set of initial alliance conditions that determine whether, and how, learning takes place between the partners.
The initial conditions could be most clearly understood as comprising a defi nition of the task to be performed, a set of action routines borrowed from the organizational contexts of each partner, a design for the interface between the partners, and a series of expectations about the performance of the allian ce (and the behaviour of one's partner) towards and within it. These initial conditions were observed to facilitate or hamper the partner's learning about the environment of their alliance, how to work together tom accomplish the alliance task, their respective skills, and each other's goals. Both how each initial condition is set, and the interdependencies they create between learning on various dimensions, infl uence learning. As the partners engaged into the alliances, and the initial conditions allowed them to start to learn, both cognitively and behaviourally, from the interactions with each other, they also started to monitor the alliance for effi ciency and each other for equity and adaptability. Their learning fed into periodic re-evaluations of the alliance according to these three assessment criteria, which, in turn, led partners to make adjustments to their relationship by moving away from its initial conditions.
26 business subjects focusing on retail sale of fast moving consumer goods including multinational trade chains and independent traders were selected from 50 biggest trade fi rms according to achieved sales published in Yearbook of Czech and Slovak Trade (2008) . Independent trade has almost half portion in the given list of trade fi rms in number of subjects. However it is necessary to mention there are some groups which are completed from indivi dual small and medium sized retail and sometime even wholesale fi rms negotiating with not all suppliers like one company. With respect on portion of total sales the situation is however signifi cantly changing. If the system approach will be used for creation of model of strategic alliance between these retail networks, fi rstly the subjects and relations must be stated. The organizational centre of strategic alliance is necessary to establish in order to gain competitive advantage through common purchase from global suppliers; those are the same suppliers for all trade alliances like members of strategic alliance. Then the regional suppliers (diff erent suppliers for diff erent trade alliances) have to be included, similarly like local suppliers, which are delivering the goods directly to individual retail stores. This is resulting from research have made through interviews with the representatives of given retail cooperative groups. Mostly these independent networks would like to entre the join collaboration unit, but they never want to become dependent only on several global suppliers. The scheme of the strategic alliance including the subjects and variant fl ows is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
SUMMARY
The main objective of the contribution is proposal of the model of co-operative trade alliance for independent trade alliances with fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) in Czech Republic. Partial goal is identifi cation of the factors aff ecting formation of joint co-operative grouping and its structure, eventually defi nition of entry conditions which should be fulfi lled by individual members. The system approach will be used to realize the given objective. This approach appears as the most suitable in consideration of anticipated structure and character of supposed model. The result will be then proposal of model of mutual co-operation between individual trade alliances. The paper focuses on a general theory of strategic alliances, synthesizing the various fi ndings in the literature on alliances from a resource-based view by examining the role of fi rm resources in strategic alliances. This theory covers four major aspects of strategic alliances: rationale, formation, structural preferences, and performance. As part of the paper, author proposes a typology of inter-partner resource alignment based on the two dimensions of resource similarity and resource utilization, yielding four types of alignment: supplementary, surplus, complementary, and wasteful. Finally, suggested theoretical conclusions are implemented on proposal of model of strategic trade alliance for independent retail networks in Czech Republic.
